ABOUT THE SYMPOSIUM
The interpretation of legal texts is one of the fundamental duties of the judiciary. The standard by which legal texts are to be interpreted, though, is subject to differing views. For instance, should the communicative meaning of the text be decisive, or at least influential? If so, how is the communicative meaning determined? Is actual authorial intent decisive or should interpretation rely on objective determinants of meaning and eschew the decisiveness of authorial intent? If the communicative meaning of a text is not decisive, what should be the determinants of meaning? Should the answers to the above questions depend on the kind of legal text being interpreted?

One might expect that those who study language would have particular insights into many of the issues involved in legal interpretation. The conference will therefore consider the extent to which disciplines that study language can help shape views of legal interpretation. The conference will address the issues raised above, as well as others relating to legal interpretation.

PROGRAM
8:30 – Registration and Continental Breakfast
9:00 – Welcome by Dean Jay Mootz and Professor Brian Slocum
9:15-10:45 - Panel 1: Constitutional Interpretation
Panelists will address issues relating to “originalism” and “public meaning” as they relate to constitutional interpretation.

Panelists:
- Larry Solum, Georgetown University School of Law
- Jay Mootz, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law
- **Scott Soames**, University of Southern California

10:45-11:00 – Morning Break

11:00-12:00 - Panel 1 (continued)

Panelists:
- **Gideon Rosen**, Princeton University
- **Kent Greenawalt**, Columbia University School of Law

12:00-1:00 – Lunch

1:00-2:30 - Panel 2: Linguistics and Ordinary Meaning
Panelists will address various issues relating to linguistics and legal interpretation, including structural semantic ambiguity, the interface of phonology and syntax, and, more generally, the contributions that linguistic theory can make to legal interpretation.

Panelists:
- **Larry Solan**, Brooklyn Law School
- **Jill Anderson**, University of Connecticut School of Law
- **Brian Slocum**, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law

2:30-2:45 - Afternoon Break

2:45-4:45 - Panel 3: Theory and Legal Interpretation
Panelists will address a wide variety of issues, including philosophical hermeneutics, the nature of the “normal speaker of English” referenced by Justice Holmes, legal speech acts, and the inferential nature of legal interpretation.

Panelists:
- **Nick Allott**, Research Fellow, CSMN, University of Oslo
- **Karen Petroski**, Saint Louis University School of Law
- **Benjamin Shaer**, Health Canada
- **Frank Ravitch**, Michigan State University College of Law

4:45-5:00 – Concluding Remarks